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This paper analyses whether active labour market programmes (ALMP) have differing effects 
on unemployment and employment dynamics according to the particular region in which 
they are implemented. To this end, it analyses alternative theoretical and econometric models 
thought to capture the possible effects of active labour market policies on labour force 
dynamics. The econometric methodologies implemented are the generalized method of 
moment (GMM) and the panel vector autoregression (P-VAR). The evidence yielded by the 
GMM models suggests that the effects of different ALMP on unemployment are dissimilar 
across the Italian regions. It follows that some active programmes are likely to have a greater 
effect in the South than in the North. The results of the P-VAR models estimated are 
synthesised by impulse response analysis and forecast error variance decomposition. The 
impulse response analysis suggests that an increase in total ALMP gives rise to (i) a decrease 
in the unemployment rate and (ii) a significant increase in labour force participation. More 
interestingly, the results obtained from the error variance decomposition analysis show that 
unemployment movements are not driven by shocks in the ALMP and that, especially in the 
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1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the OECD Jobs Study has emphasised the role of active 
labour market policies (ALMPs) in reducing structural unemployment. Moreover, the 
European Employment Strategy, launched at the Luxembourg Job Summit and restated in the 
Lisbon strategy, gives ALMPs the task of increasing investments in human capital and of 
attracting more people into the labour market. 
Why a government should adopt ALMPs in reducing unemployment can be 
demonstrated by a variety of theoretical models in which implementation of ALMPs has a 
positive effect on the matching process as well as on job competition. Other advantages are 
an increase in productivity, the better allocation of labour among sectors, and greater 
geographic mobility.  
However, in spite of theoretical and political preferences for ALMP spending, real data 
reveal a quite different picture. In the period from 1985 to 2000, the OECD countries did 
not significantly increase expenditure on active programmes as a percentage of GDP - less 
than 1% on average. Moreover, there was no tendency to switch resources from passive to 
active programmes. 
ALMP may in fact have ambiguous effects on the regular labour demand. An active 
labour policy may engender a crowding-out process through the well-known deadweight 
effect, the substitution effect, or an accommodation effect on wage setting. For these 
reasons, the net employment effect of ALMPs is an empirical issue, with the consequence 
that monitoring and evaluating them is important. 
There is a large quantity of empirical literature which focuses on whether ALMPs have 
positive effects on unemployment. Most of these studies use microeconometric techniques 
to evaluate the effects of ALMPs on individual performance. Other studies use 
macroeconometric models to analyse the net effect of ALMPs on the economy as a whole. 
This paper takes a macroeconomic perspective. Its empirical analysis is based on a variety 
of econometric techniques thought to capture the possible effects of active labour market 
policies on employment and unemployment dynamics. The aim in particular is to assess 
whether an ALMP may have asymmetric effects in different regions in which it is 
implemented. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyses the OECD’s view of ALMP 
effectiveness in reducing structural unemployment. Section 3 focuses on the theoretical 
effects of ALMP. Section 4 highlights some peculiarities of the Italian labour market. Section 
5 moves to the empirical models of labour market policies and presents the results obtained   3
from the GMM and the P-VAR models. The section also sets out the main results of 
impulse response analysis and of forecast error variance decomposition. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The ALMP and the OECD perspective 
The well-known OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994; OECD, 1996) emphasised active labour 
market policies (ALMP) as a means to combat structural unemployment (Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman, 1991). The general conclusion was that the focus of labour market policies should 
shift from the passive provision of income support to more active measures to assist re-
employment, the reason being that subsidies raise the reservation wage and consequently 
have strong negative effects on the duration of unemployment and on job search intensity. 
Active labour measures, on the other hand, can improve the match between the labour 
demand and supply and reduce the long-term unemployment of disadvantaged workers.1 
The European Employment Strategy (EES), launched at the Luxembourg Job Summit 
(November, 1997) on the basis of the new provisions in the Employment Title of the Treaty, 
and reiterated in the Lisbon Strategy (Lisbon European Council, March, 2000), has given 
new impulse to ALMPs, stressing their importance not only as alternatives to subsidies but 
also  per se. The European Strategy, in fact, gives ALMPs the task of increasing the 
adaptability of workers and enterprises, attracting more people into the labour market, and of 
making investment in human capital more effective by adopting a preventive and more 
active approach to the unemployed (Commission of European Communities, 2003).  
Country surveys, however, have revealed that ALMPs have achieved rather limited 
success in that they suffer from ineffective delivery, monitoring and evaluating mechanisms, 
as well as poor targeting and other design problems. Consequently, despite theoretical and 
political preferences for ALMP spending, the data reveal a quite different picture. average 
spending on active programmes in the OECD countries increased very little between 1985 
and 2000 as a percentage of GDP (from 0.7 to 0.8) (Martin and Grubb, 2001). The same 
trend was apparent in the European countries (from 0.9 to 1.0). There is no tendency to 
switch resources from passive to active programmes, while both moving in accordance with 
unemployment. Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of expenditure in active and passive 
policies across various EU and non-EU countries during the 1980s and the 1990s.  
                                                           
1 The OECD divides public spending on labour programmes between “active and passive” measures.  The 
former aim at improving the employability of the unemployed by raising their job-related skills and enhancing 
the functioning of the labour market. It is possible to distinguish among five groups of measures: (1) public 
employment services, (2) labour market training, (3) youth measures, (4) subsidized employment, (5) measures 
for the disabled. The latter are income transfers to the unemployed, namely (1) unemployment benefits, and 
(2) early retirement pensions paid for labour market reasons (Martin and Grubb, 2001).   4
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Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, various issues 
In terms of the level of expenditure, measured as a share of the GDP, three groups of 
countries can be distinguished. The first includes countries such as Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Belgium, which had high levels of expenditure on both active and passive 
policy measures during the 1980s. An intermediate group comprises countries with higher-
than average expenditure on active, but not passive, income support, such as Sweden and 
Italy, and countries with higher-than-average expenditure on passive, but not active,   5
measures, such as Spain. The last and largest group includes countries such as Japan, the 
USA, Austria, Portugal, Greece and Switzerland, with very low levels of expenditure on both 
active and passive measures. Policies in the three groups of countries have not changed since 
the 1980s and 1990s. There has been a general reduction in outlays on passive measures, 
while a group of European countries - Spain, France, Germany and Finland - have 
substantially increased their spending on active measures. Sweden, by contrast, has reduced 
its percentage of ALMP expenditure.  
Figure 3 shows that the hypothesis of a direct negative relation between ALMP 
expenditures and the unemployment rate does not hold. Indeed, countries with low 
percentages of ALMP/GDP, but also countries that allocate a higher proportion of GDP to 
ALMP, have lower unemployment rates. The highest unemployment rate occurs in the 
countries occupying intermediate positions. 











































3 The Theoretical Effects of ALMPs 
From a theoretical point of view, the effects of ALMPs can be studied by using two 
models which reach very similar conclusions: the well-known Jackman, Layard and Nickell 
labour market framework, distinguishing between a wage-setting and a labour-demand 
relationship (Jackman, Layard and Nickel 1991; Calmfors 1994; Calmfors and Lang 1995), 
and the Beveridge curve framework derived from a matching function combined with job   6
search theory2. According to the latter, the functioning of labour market can be described, 
under certain conditions, with a stock-flow model underlying a non-linear negative 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate (the Beveridge curve). 
This relationship is due to the behaviour of workers in seeking employment, the behaviour 
of employers in screening applicants for vacancies, and the ‘matching technology’ in the 
labour market by which searching workers and searching firms are brought together. 
Mismatches by region, by occupation and by qualification, frictions in job search 
intensity, reservation wage and reservation productivity influence equilibrium unemployment 
and the slope of the curve. 
As stressed by Jackman, Pissarides and Savouri (1990)3, having labour policies more 
active than passive reduces labour market mismatches and search frictions. Moreover, 
ALMPs make a given job creation programme more effective with regard to employment, 
and they also cause the curve to flatten. Finally, the matching process is accelerated as 
obstacles are removed. 
Calmfors (1994) analyses various effects of ALMPs, distinguishing among: (i) effects on 
the matching process; (ii) effects on the competition for jobs; (iii) productivity effects; (iv) 
effects on the allocation of labour among sectors and geographic mobility; (v) direct 
crowding-out effects on regular labour demand; and (vi) accommodation effects on wage 
setting. 
ALMPs, particularly job-broking and counselling activities, give greater efficiency to the 
matching process because they promote more active searches by job–seekers (treatment effect).  
On the other hand, there may also be an opposite locking in effect that is, if participants 
do not find job opportunities before programmes are completed, or if they continue to have 
low probabilities of being employed on conclusion of the programme.4  
Job-matching improvement facilitates the hiring process of firms and then lowers the 
cost of posting vacancies, as well as limiting wage settings. In terms of the matching model, 
these effects can be synthesised by reductions in the reservation wage and reservation 
productivity. 
                                                           
2 There are substantially two theoretical foundations for the Beveridge curve: the first is based on a 
model developed by Hansen and derives the matching function from an aggregation over distinct 
markets in the presence of frictions and limited labour mobility. The second is a matching model in a 
stock-flow framework. See Pissarides(1990), Hall (1977), McCall (1970) and Mortensens (1970). For a 
recent survey see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). 
3Jackman, Pissarides and Savouri, 1990, p. 480. 
4 Caroleo and Pastore, 2004 have detected the existence of a “training trap” for young unemployed 
persons in Italy, where participation in training programmes increases the probability of repeating this 
type of programme without improving the probability of finding a job.     7
Reservation productivity and the reservation wage are also affected by the effects on 
competition for jobs and productivity effects. It is self-evident that participation in ALMPs 
(especially training programmes and job creation measures providing on-the-job training) 
increases the productivity of job-seekers, even if their reservation wages increase as well. The 
net effect is a matter for empirical investigation. Employment subsidies instead directly 
decrease labour costs for firms. ALMP participation may also have a positive effect on 
labour force participation, in that it increases the motivation to actively seek work and 
therefore increases the competition for the jobs available (Johansson, 2001).  
Finally, the desired effect of ALMPs is a change in the allocation of the labour force 
among sectors, skills and regions. If there is full employment among skilled workers, or in 
certain regions, or sectors, and if wages are flexible, employment subsidies or training 
programmes intended to increase the hiring probability of unskilled workers or workers 
employed in regions with high unemployment and wage rigidity have a positive effect on 
output and employment.  
Likewise, a policy intended to reallocate workers from unskilled to skilled jobs, from low 
productivity sectors to high productivity sectors, or from low labour demand regions to high 
labour demand regions, also has a positive effect on gross output. As a consequence, if, for 
example, unskilled workers are retrained and become more skilled, the labour supply in the 
skilled sector augments, and if wages become more flexible, labour demand increases to the 
same extent. But the unskilled sector will be unaffected owing to wage rigidity (Layard, 1999; 
Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstòm 2002; Calmfors and Skedinger 1995); .  
An unintentional side-effect is that ALMPs (especially subsidized employment schemes) 
may crowd out (displacement effect) regular labour demand. In fact, a deadweight effect occurs 
when the same person would have been hired even in the absence of such subsidies, and a 
substitution effect occurs when the subsidies induce employers to substitute one category of 
workers for another.5 
An indirect crowding-out effect may come about to the extent that ALMPs improve the 
welfare of the unemployed through higher income rather than unemployment benefit for 
participants; a higher level of psychological well-being due to being employed; improvement 
in future labour market prospects; extension of income support beyond the maximum 
unemployment benefit period. In this case, the reservation wage is increased and the 
intensity of the job search is reduced. Wage pressure is increased.    
                                                           
5 The displacement effect can have a positive employment effect to the extent that the employment of 
the long-term unemployed (outsiders) crowds out the employment of insiders, so that the latter 
group encounters more competition and moderates wage settings.   8
4 A Macroeconomic Evaluation of ALMPs in Italy 
As discussed above, the net employment effect of ALMPs is an empirical issue. 
Consequently, it is important to monitor and evaluate these policies. However, although 
monitoring now takes place in Italy, evaluation to date has only been carried out using the 
conventional programme-oriented approach to policy evaluation6.  
Empirical research on the effects of ALMPs is of two types: microeconomic and 
macroeconomic. Microeconomic studies evaluate the effects of participation in ALMPs 
on the participating individuals, comparing their labour market outcomes to those that 
would have prevailed had they not participated in an active programme. Macroeconomic 
studies examine aggregate, general equilibrium effects. The issue addressed in what 
follows is whether ALMPs represent a net gain for the economy as whole. There are two 
alternatives to consider: whether ALMPs positively affect both unemployment and 
output, or whether the effect is simply distributional, that is, whether work is shifted from 
the old to the young or from a region to another (Bellmann and Jackman, 1996).  Studies 
on the matter concern the evaluation of a Beveridge curve or a matching function, or a 
wage-setting function, and the evaluation of the direct, crowding-out effect or the effects 
of ALMPs on labour force participation (Hujer and Caliendo 2000).  
The method chosen to evaluate ALMPs in Italy is a reduced form which enables 
estimation of the net effects of ALMP participation on employment or unemployment in 
a regional framework (Hujer, Blien, Caliendo and Zeiss, 2002; Calmfors and Skedinger 
1995). This type of methodology has been used mainly by studies based on OECD data 
which explain the cross-country variation in unemployment rates by the cross-country 
variation in a number of labour market institutions; one of them being ALMP (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman, 1991; Nickell, 1997; Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell and Layard, 1999; 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) 7.  
                                                           
6 For a comprehensive survey of the evaluation studies carried out in Italy, see Trivellato, Martini and 
Rettore, 2001. 
7 The main difference between studies based on OECD data and our methodology is the ALMP 
measure. The former generally use expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) on ALMP, whilst we use 
participants in active policy programmes. The ALMP measure employed in a large number of studies 
using OECD data is:  = / r y br u y (see the appendix in Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstrom 2002), 
where r is the number of participants as a fraction of the labour force, u is the unemployment rate, y is 
GDP per capita,  r b is the expenditure on ALMP per programme participant. Consequently, the 
relation of the two measures is the following:  () ργ
− =
1 / r ub y .   9
There are various drawbacks to a macroeconomic assessment of active labour market 
policies of the sort that we conduct below. Because we must work with aggregated data, 
the results tend to become vague and less robust. In many cases, we must deal with 
relatively crude data, making use of proxy variables when necessary. But the main 
problem is that of endogeneity or simultaneity. Given that governments react to rising 
unemployment or other labour market problems with increased policy efforts, it becomes 
very difficult to distinguish the effect of policy on the labour market. Basically, 
expenditures on ALMPs may affect the unemployment rate, but it may be equally the case 
that the level of unemployment affects spending on ALMPs.  
We use data on participation in active and passive labour policies furnished by the 
MLPS  Rapporto di Monitoraggio and reconstructed on a monthly basis from 1996:1 to 
2002:6, and by region. The main active policies considered are: (a) mixed cause contracts; 
(b) subsidies for long-term or short-term employment; (c) incentives for the stabilization 
of short-term contracts, (d) incentives for self-employment8. In contrast to the OECD’s 
examination of ALMPs, the Rapporto di Monitoraggio restricts its analysis to measures 
targeted on young people and employment subsidies. Recently, however, it has also 
                                                           
8 We now briefly describe the different ALMP we consider in the paper.  
a) Mixed cause contracts are work contracts which include the training of the worker during working 
hours. The main training contracts provided by Italian law are youth training contracts (YTC) and 
apprenticeship contracts. YTC are short-term contacts aiming at fostering youth employment by 
lowering payroll taxes for employers and by increasing trainees’ opportunity to become employmed 
through increasing the work experience as well as the acquisition of high skills. The eligibility and 
contribution rules of this program vary significantly across regions and over time. The apprenticeship 
contract are short-term contracts including both working hours and training hours. In particular, the 
employer have to pay workers for their actual working hours and to provide training and formation 
courses for his employees in order increase workers’ skill. They also reduce the payroll taxes. 
b) Subsidies for long-term and short-term employment. These subsidies aim at encouraging hiring 
disadvantages workers (workers in mobility lists, long-term unemployed, long-term CIG– Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni – workers and disabled workers in social cooperatives) by lowering the labour 
cost. The subsidies consist of reducing payroll taxes or transferring a part of unemployment benefits 
to the employers. 
c) Incentives for the stabilization of short-term contracts; These are Employer hiring incentives for 
employment promotion of short-term job seekers. Particularly, they are used to transform short-term 
contracts like apprenticeship contracts and YTCs in long-term contracts. In the southern Italian 
regions these incentives consist of tax credits for the newly stipulated long-term contracts. 
d) Incentives for self-employment. The purpose of these incentives is to prevent the worsening of 
structural unemployment and encourage newly unemployed people to enter the labor market by 
providing two different incentive schemes: Prestito d’Onore (Loan of honour ) and Imprenditoria 
Giovanile (Youth entrepreneurship). Prestito d’Onore aims at promoting youth self employment and 
consist of technical assistance and training course to the start-up phase and financial incentives to self-
employment activities. Imprenditoria Giovanile provides financial incentives to the sunk capital and 
credit for youth entrepreneurships. 
   10
produced data on training measures and on public employment services, but without 
providing information on the time series.  
Outcome variables are the labour market indices representing the main objectives of 
the European Employment Strategy: the employment rate, the unemployment rate, and 
the youth unemployment rate. 
The period examined is 1996-2002, which corresponds to a marked positive cycle of 
increased employment. If we compare this period with a previous one similar to it (1985-
1991), we observe that employment increased notwithstanding relative stagnation in 
economic growth. 
There are several explanations for this positive cycle: the introduction of more flexible 
forms of employment (atypical contracts), increased employment among women, 
employment creation in the services sector, and the concurrence of a period of wage 
restraint. Moreover, one of the main explanations is the subject of our inquiry: 
implementation of the European Employment Strategy (begun in 1998) and renewed 
impulse to ALMPs.  
The following figures give a broad measure of the relationship between ALMP 
expenditures and passive labour market policy (PLMP) expenditures by the Italian regions. 
To be noted is that, in the period between 1996 and 2002, there was a general reduction in 
the percentage of passive policies over GDP. As observed for the OECD countries, during the 
second half of the Nineties, while there has been a general reduction of the PLMP/GDP ratio, the 
ALMP over GDP ratio has remained substantially unchanged.  
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5 Empirical Models of Labour Market Policies 
The empirical analysis studies the possible asymmetries that the implementation of the 
ALMP might produce in active policies participating regions. The relevance of the issues is 
related to the possible asymmetries that the different conditions of the Italian regions' labour 
market may arise concerning the propagation of active policy shocks. The hypothesis 
underlying our empirical investigation is that, given the different economic structures 
characterizing the Italian regions, the ALMPs might produce asymmetric effects on the 
regional labour markets. More specifically, the ALMP may influence the matching process as 
well as the labour market equilibrium conditions. 
In this part of the analysis we use different dynamic modelling approaches to investigate 
the effects of ALMP in Italy. Asymmetries are investigated in two different ways.  
First, we use dynamic panel data frameworks to estimate the effects that three specific 
ALMP measures might produce on labour market performance. These techniques are 
thought to capture the possible effect that alternative active labour market policies may have 
on unemployment, employment and youth unemployment dynamics.  
Second, a P-VAR is estimated to evaluate how the atypical contracts have influenced the 
labour market performance in the last years. In particular, the aim of this analysis is to assess   12
whether the changes in the employment structure leading from the huge increase in the 
atypical contracts have produced different effects according to the particular region in which 
these contracts are used. 
The study employs panel data models for the twenty Italian regions. Each model is 
estimated for several dependent variables including employment rate, unemployment rate, 
and youth unemployment rate. The explanatory variables are a set of active labour market 
policies. Moreover, some variables enter the estimation as instruments. These variables are 
GDP per capita, gross fixed investments, GDP per worker, and the school-attendance rate. 
The sample period is from 1996:1 to 2002:6. The data used for the empirical analysis were 
drawn from different sources: the monthly data on labour market policies from the Ministry 
of Welfare; the data on unemployment and employment from Istat publications. The 
significant difference between the Southern and the Northern Italian labour markets makes it 
necessary to analyse the areas separately. There are eight cross-sections for Southern Italy, 
and twelve for Northern Italy.  
As stated above, the study uses two different econometric techniques to analyse the 
afore-mentioned issues: the first is the generalized method of moment (GMM); the second 
consists of applying the vector autoregression framework to panel data (P-VAR).  
5.1 The Effectiveness of Alternative ALMPs: a GMM model 
The modern approach to the estimation of system instrumental variables is based on the 
principle of the generalized method of moment (GMM).  
The three policies we consider are mixed cause contracts (henceforth, MCC); subsidized 
employment (SE), which is the sum of subsidies for long-term or short-term hirings; and job 
stabilization (JS), that is, incentives for the stabilization of short-term contracts and 
incentives for self-employment. 
In order to analyse the effects of ALMP on the unemployment rate, we estimate the 
following basic equation: 
α γϕ ϑ η ε −− −− =++ + + + + ,, 11 1 1 , , ,
MCC SE JS
i t i t it it it i t i t i t uu x x x D  (1) 
with  == 1,....,    and   1,...., iNtT . 
In the specified equation,  −1
MCC
it x  represents the mixed cause contracts ratio;  −1
SE
it x  is the 
subsidized employment ratio;  −1
JS
it x  represents the job stabilization ratio;  , it D  is a vector of 
time invariant region-specific effects;  , it η  is a vector of region invariant time specific effects;   13
and ε , it is an i.i.d. vector of disturbances. It is most useful to include a time specific effect in 
order to capture aggregate shocks which may be present in a particular period. 
Each ratio has been constructed as the total number of participants in a programme in a 
particular region divided by the total working-age population in the same region. Then, the 
response coefficientsγ , ϕ  and ϑ  measure the effect exerted by increase of participants in 
active labour market programmes on unemployment dynamics.   
Time and region dummies are very important components of the specification. Time 
dummies may reduce the reverse causality problem if the timing of adverse shocks is 
correlated between regions. Region fixed effects capture all time-invariant institutional and 
economic characteristics explaining why one region has a different-from-average 
unemployment rate.  
The importance of these region-specific effects should not be underestimated. For 
example, since the mid-1990s, Abruzzo has spent, on average, a lower percentage of GDP 
on ALMPs than Campania (4 percent for Abruzzo and 7 percent for Campania), yet 
Abruzzo had a higher business-sector employment rate in the sample period (35 percent 
compared to 26 percent for Campania). If only variables capturing institutional effects 
(which, in general, are not very precise) are used to control for region-specific effects, some 
of the differences in employment caused by other institutional factors will be wrongly 
attributed to ALMP spending. 
The equation for unemployment rate in (1) can be rewritten as a dynamic panel data 
model with the different ALMP as dependent variables: 
α ηε −− =+ Γ + + + ,, 1 , 1 , , , it it it it it it uuX D  
where  − ,1 it X  is a row vector of unemployment determinants including ALMP measures 
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where the instrument matrix 
*
i Z is a block diagonal matrix. As we use two different 
GMM methods of estimation, the instrument matrix varies according to the selected method. 
In particular, we estimated the model by using both the GMM estimator in first differences 
(GMM-DIF) and the system estimator (GMM-SYS). The GMM-DIF is a two-step GMM 
estimator, based on first differences (Arellano and Bond 1991). The GMM-SYS is a two-step 
GMM system estimator, based on first differences and levels equations (Blundell and Bond,   14
1998). The instrument matrix we use in the estimations is constructed as follows9. The 
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As the time dimension is relatively large compared to the number of cross-sections we 
have restricted the number of moment conditions for both GMM estimators. In fact, as 
stressed in Arellano and Bond (1998), by truncating the instrument set we may reduce the 
overfitting bias problem. For these reasons, we have truncated the history after T-6 for the 
first-differenced GMM estimator. Moreover, for the system GMM estimator we have 
truncated the history after T-4. 
We test the validity of the assumed moment restrictions by computing several 
specification tests. The first two statistics test the significance of all parameters and of the 
dummies by calculating standard Wald tests. These tests give useful information about the 
general fitness of the selected specification. The third statistic tests the overall validity of 
instruments by employing a Sargan test (1958) of over-identifying restrictions. The Sargan 
test is distributed as a 
2 χ  with p-k degrees of freedom, where p is the number of columns in 
the instrument matrix and k is the number of variables under the null hypothesis of validity 
of the selected instruments. In our specification, the Sargan test is based on the two step 
estimator. The fourth and the fifth statistics test for first- and second-order serial correlation. 
We now concentrate on the relative ability of alternative active policies to affect the 
unemployment rate, the employment rate, and the youth unemployment rate.  
                                                           
9 The usual procedure is to take  − ,2 it y  as instrument for the lagged dependent variable in differences 
() −− ,1 ,2 , it it yy;  − ,2 it x  is taken as instrument for the regressors in differences ( ) −− ,1 ,2 , it it xx . This 
means that one will loose the first two observations of the panel to construct instruments and the 
estimation starts for t=3. 
   15
The specified dynamic panel data model was estimated using three alternative methods. 
Table 1 reports the GMM estimator in first differences (GMM-DIF), the system estimator 
(GMM-SYS), and the Fixed Effect (FE) results.  
 
Table 1: GMM Estimates of the Unemployment Rate 
South
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Unemployment (t-1) 0.82 [0.06] 0.86 [0.02] 0.84 [0.13]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.12 [0.21] -0.14 [0.24] -0.16 [0.05]
Job Incentive (t-1) -0.33 [0.19] -0.20 [0.08] -0.24 [0.11]
Employment Stabilization (t-1) -0.10 [0.05] -0.08 [0.03] -0.12 [0.04]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 57.53 [0.000] 847.5 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 1151 [0.000] 24430 [0.000]
Sargan Test 15.56 [0.927] 12.84 [0.914]
First-order serial correlation -1.653 [0.098] -1.774 [0.076]
Second-order serial correlation -1.762 [0.078] -2.751 [0.006]
North
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Unemployment (t-1) 0.77 [0.04] 0.81 [0.38] 0.84 [0.21]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.33 [0.14] -0.28 [0.18] -0.31 [0.10]
Job Incentive (t-1) -0.16 [0.28] -0.11 [0.06] -0.18 [0.06]
Employment Stabilization (t-1) -28.00 [0.14] -0.30 [0.11] -0.31 [0.09]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 1325.0 [0.000] 507.2 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 4535.0 [0.000] 157.2 [0.000]
Sargan Test 17.0 [0.881] 61.8 [0.006]
First-order serial correlation -2.8 [0.006] -1.9 [0.061]




Note: The estimations include region dummies of which the coefficients are not 
reported. Standard errors robust to serial correlation are reported in parenthesis.  
 
The size of the response coefficients seems to quite robust over the different 
specifications. Table 1 shows that, in the northern regions, an increase in mixed cause 
contracts (MCC) produces a larger response in terms of unemployment reaction, with a 
decrease of 33 basis points in the GMM-DIF model. The response is much smaller in the 
southern regions. An increase of one percent in MCC induces a fall in the unemployment 
rate of 12 basis points. 
The results suggest that, while SE is more effective in the South (-0.33) than in the North 
(-0.16), an increase in job stabilization (JS) produces a greater decrease in northern 
unemployment (-0.28) with respect to the fall in the southern unemployment rate (-0.10). 
The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions cannot reject the set of instruments for both 
estimators. The test reject the selected moment restrictions only for the GMM-SYS model 
for the North. The tests also highlight the absence of first and second order serial correlation 
of error terms.      16
Table 2 presents the results of the GMM estimates for the model in which the 
employment rate is considered to be the dependent variable. 
 
Table 2: GMM Estimates of the Employment Rate 
South
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Eemployment (t-1) 0.78 [0.13] 0.85 [0.14] 0.89 [0.02]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) 0.18 [0.06] 0.20 [0.13] 0.21 [0.09]
Job Incentive (t-1) 0.48 [0.18] 0.44 [0.18] 0.39 [0.16]
Employment Stabilization (t-1) 0.04 [0.04] 0.03 [0.04] 0.10 [0.04]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 275.5 [0.000] 179.3 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 32890 [0.000] 1970 [0.000]
Sargan Test 22.66 [0.598] 18.95 [0.800]
First-order serial correlation -2.041 [0.041] -1.759 [0.079]
Second-order serial correlation -1.832 [0.067] -1.445 [0.148]
North
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Eemployment (t-1) 0.71 [0.02] 0.73 [0.01] 0.76 [0.21]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) 0.32 [0.14] 0.30 [0.09] 0.35 [0.16]
Job Incentive (t-1) 0.23 [0.11] 0.22 [0.14] 0.24 [0.10]
Employment Stabilization (t-1) 0.30 [0.12] 0.24 [0.16] 0.27 [0.12]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 1386 [0.000] 4514 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 1837 [0.000] 800 [0.000]
Sargan Test 28.2 [0.297] 48.7 [0.049]
First-order serial correlation -2.0 [0.047] -2.35 [0.019]





Note: The estimations include region dummies of which the coefficients are not 
reported. Standard errors robust to serial correlation are reported in parenthesis.  
 
In this case, too, a 1% increase in the mixed caused contracts induces a larger increase in 
the northern employment rate (0.32) than in southern employment (0.18). The opposite is 
the case of the other active policy considered. In the South, an increase in SE generates a rise 
in the employment rate of 0.48%, while in the North the effect is an increase of 0.23%. The 
results obtained by using the three estimators explained above do not show large 
discrepancies.  
Also in this case the Sargan test cannot reject the selected set of instruments for both 
estimators. The evidence from Table 2 corroborates the finding obtained with the 
unemployment rate model. In fact, both the coefficients for the selected policy are 
significant. However, it seems that, while JS exerts a greater effect in the South, MCC is 
more effective in the North. 
We finally look at the ability of the three active policy indicators to reduce the youth 
unemployment rate, finding in this case that the relative size of the coefficients observed 
above is not valid. In fact, Table 3 suggests a higher JS coefficient for the North as well as a   17
lower MCC coefficient for the South. In general, the active labour policy response 
coefficients for the southern regions are lower than the ones obtained for the northern ones. 
 
Table 3: GMM Estimates of the Youth Unemployment Rate 
South
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Youth Unemployment (t-1) 0.88 [0.13] 0.85 [0.15] 0.90 [0.16]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.24 [0.10] -0.24 [0.14] -0.21 [0.31]
Job Incentive (t-1) -0.33 [0.15] -0.40 [0.18] -0.44 [0.18]
Employment Stabilization (t-1) -0.18 [0.16] -0.13 [0.12] -0.23 [0.11]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 2206 [0.000] 579.6 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 388 [0.000] 13990 [0.000]
Sargan Test 16.33 [0.905] 16.97 [0.883]
First-order serial correlation -1.923 [0.054] -1.951 [0.051]
Second-order serial correlation -2.751 [0.006] -2.134 [0.033]
North
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Youth Unemployment (t-1) 0.71 [0.12] 0.75 [0.12] 0.79 [0.21]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.34 [0.52] -0.36 [0.24] -0.40 [0.50]
Job Incentive (t-1) -0.73 [0.27] -0.69 [0.15] -0.58 [0.20]
Employment Stabilization (t-1) -0.44 [0.36] -0.47 [0.18] -0.31 [0.11]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 32.4 [0.000] 350.0 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 5056.0 [0.000] 283.7 [0.000]
Sargan Test 23.3 [0.561] 12.8 [0.914]
First-order serial correlation -2.3 [0.024] -2.6 [0.009]




Note: The estimations include region dummies of which the coefficients are not 
reported. Standard errors robust to serial correlation are reported in parenthesis.  
 
5.2  Unemployment, ALMP and atypical contracts: a P-VAR 
model 
There has been a growing interest in the use of panel VAR models for applied labour 
policy analysis. Problems concerning the evaluation of the effect of regional policies lend 
themselves naturally to study in this framework. Vector autoregression (VAR) models are 
widely used in econometric studies and in a broad variety of fields. The extension to panel 
data is an interesting challenge given the possible presence of cross-sectional heterogeneity.  
Let us consider a panel VAR model with fixed time dimension T and derive asymptotic 
properties of a proposed estimation method with respect to the cross-sectional dimension N.  
In particular, we estimate a second order VAR using a four variables system comprising 
the unemployment rate, participation rate, a ratio of atypical contracts over the total of 
employees, and active labour market policy. We include atypical contracts in the estimated   18
model because, in recent years, significant change has taken place in the structure of 
employment. This structural change has resulted in a decrease in permanent, full-time 
'typical' employment and an increase in the so-called 'atypical', 'contingent' or 'non-standard' 
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  (2) 
where  t u  is the unemployment rate;  , it p  represent the participation ratio;  , it AC  is a 
ratio of atypical contracts; and  t ALMPis the active labour market policy rate as constructed 
above;  () CL is a finite-order lag polynomial matrix. The region-fixed effects, i.e. the 
vectorD , account for institutional differences as well as other region-specific unobserved 
influences on unemployment. This means that the system allows for different region-specific 
constant terms in each equation, since some regions may have higher average unemployment 
rates and more active labour policies than others, for reasons that are not captured by the 
explanatory variables. In the specified model, the four variables are assumed to be stationary. 
The structure of this system incorporates a feedback relationship between  t u  and  t ALMP. 
This means that the two variables are allowed to affect each other contemporaneously. The 
contemporaneous relations among the variables are described in the A matrix. 
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with  ()
'
t t Ee e = Σ . 
The VAR model can be rewritten as: 
ε − = ++ ,1 it i i i t it yD K y   (4) 
where  == 1,....,    and   1,...., iNtT .   19
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As the impulse response functions crucially depend on these coefficient, the assumptions 
we made on this matrix significantly influence our results. In principal, the VAR model can 
be estimated either under the null of homogeneity, using a fixed effects OLS estimator, or 
under the alternative of heterogeneity of slope coefficients, i.e. using the mean group 
estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
The mean group estimator allows coefficients and error variances to vary by region and 
estimates (4) separately for each region. Pooled (or fixed effects) OLS by contrast, assumes 
that coefficients and error variances are homogeneous across regions, allowing only for 
region specific fixed effects: = i KK  for i=1,2,….,N. This hypothesis results in the following 
model: 
ε − = ++ ,1 it i i t it yD K y    (5) 
As discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995), results are likely to vary significantly with 
respect to the estimation method, i.e from the least restrictive, but potentially not efficient 
mean group estimator, to the fixed effect estimator that only allows intercepts to vary across 
regions. We estimated the models with both techniques and compute a Haussman type test 
of the difference between the two estimators. Under the null of homogeneity the tests 
statistic is distributed as aχ
2 with k+1 degrees of freedom where k stands for the number of 
explanatory variables. Specifically, the model just outlined was estimated separately for the 
South and North. Moreover, two different models were estimated for each macro area: in 
Model 1 the variable AC consisted of the ratio between part-time workers and total 
employees, while in Model 2 AC was the ratio between fixed-term workers and total 
dependent employees. We then compute the Haussman statistic for the four models. 
Applying this test, we can not reject the null of homogeneity in all estimated models. 
Specifically, we do not reject homogeneity in the case of the model for South with part-time 
(a statistic of 3.17 with p-value 0.17) as well when atypical contracts are proxied by Fixed-
term contracts (2.82 with p-value 0.42). We obtain the same results for the North models. 
Precisely, the statistic equals 1.21 with p-value 0.75 when part-time contracts are considered 
and, 1.14 with p-value 0.78 when fixed-term contracts are included in the model.    20
We then estimate the following models by using fixed effect estimators.  The four 
different specifications (Model 1 and Model 2 for South and North) were, then, estimated by 
adopting fixed effect estimator in order to assess possible asymmetries between northern and 
southern regional unemployment levels in response to a shock to AC and ALMP. 
The structural parameters are identified by imposing linear restriction on the elements of 
A and B, taking into accounts the following relation between VAR innovations and 
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Starting from the 
2
) 1 ( + n n  free elements of Σ ˆ , the lack of identification emerges from 
estimation of 
2 2 n n +  parameters contained in A and B. 
The identification problem is solved by restricting the contemporaneous relation matrix 
to a lower triangular form. This solution imposes a recursive structure on the economy, 
giving rise to a particular causal ordering of the variables in the system. In particular, we 
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The assumption ( 14 0 a = ) means that  t ALMP does not have a contemporaneous effect 
on  t u . In other words, both 
u
t ε  and 
ALMP
t ε shocks affect the contemporaneous value 
of t ALMP, but only 
u
t ε  shocks affect the contemporaneous value of  t u .  
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: a shock to labour policy 
instruments ALMP in period t affects the unemployment rate at time t+1. In fact, at time t 
the unemployment rate is predetermined, and hence cannot be influenced by any policy 
instrument. For example, an increase in active labour policy increases labour force 
participation, thereby facilitating a decrease in the unemployment rate.   21
5.3   Results of the Impulse-Response Analysis 
This section presents the estimated dynamic effects of AC and active labour policy 
shocks on unemployment examining in particular the similarity of unemployment responses 
in each area. This is accomplished by using impulse response functions with a structural 
decomposition of the variance covariance matrix explained above. A 20-quarter horizon is 
considered. 
The estimated responses to a 1% increase in unemployment and ALMP are reported in 
Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9. Each response is provided with the associated asymptotic confidence 
bands. The impulse responses for the southern regions are significantly larger than those for 
the northern ones. The patterns of the responses are qualitatively similar in the two areas. 
Importantly, the results also suggest that the unemployment rate in the selected regions 
responds to identical labour policy shocks with different speeds and movements, as well as 
with different magnitudes of the effects. 
In fact, a positive ALMP shock decreases unemployment. Moreover, after an initial delay, 
the response function displays a hump-shaped pattern that reaches maximum decline after 
roughly two years in the North and three years in the South. 
The different adjustment speeds of the unemployment rates to ALMP shocks for the two 
selected areas can be partly explained by the existence of a higher degree of labour market 
rigidity in the South. This finding suggests that the 'efficiency' of the labour market should be 
improved. 
On the other hand, the different magnitudes of the effect can be explained by considering 
the existing differences in both the number of vacancies and the number of unemployed in 
the two areas. Whilst the northern regions are characterized by a large number of vacancies 
and a small number of unemployed workers (the upper part of the Beveridge curve), 
southern regions have a small number of vacancies and a large number of unemployed (the 
lower part of the Beveridge curve). It follows that an identical increase in ALMP has a 
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The average response and the maximum impact of a contractionary labour policy shock 
are shown in Table 8.  
Table 8 Estimated Response Function Features 
Part-time Almp Fixed-term Almp Part-time Almp Fixed-term Almp
-0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.04 -0.34
-0.06 -0.19 -0.12 -0.23 -0.20 -0.24 -0.07 -0.53
61 01 01 0 1 29 1 01 1
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South North
M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  1M o d e l  2
 
 
Table 8 outlines some key characteristics of the estimated response functions. In 
particular, it gives information about the maximum impact and the average responses of the 
unemployment rate to ALMP and AC structural shocks. The table also considers the time 
that a shock takes to exert its maximum effect on unemployment, as well as the time that it 
takes to die out.  
Despite some qualitative similarities, the table seems to suggest the existence of different 
quantitative responses across regions. In both areas, an ALMP shock produces a decline in 
the unemployment rate. However, the magnitudes of the effect are quite dissimilar. Whilst in 
the South the unemployment rate decreases by more than 20 basis points (Model 2 - South), 
an ALMP shock in the North reduces the unemployment rate by 53 basis points (Model 2 - 
North). The maximum impact of fixed-term contracts is observed in the southern regions: -
12 basis points. Moreover, the effect of fixed-term shock reaches its maximum later than in 
the North, so that in the Southern regions, the unemployment rate appears to be more 
greatly influenced by the changes in the number of fixed-term contracts. Finally, there are no 
large differences across regions in the time that the shock takes to die out. A fixed-term 
shock lasts longer in southern regions, but an ALMP shock seems to be more persistent in 
the north.  
Asymmetries are also detected in the response of the unemployment rate to an 
exogenous part-time shock. Again, the largest responses are observed in the North: in 
particular, the response of unemployment in the northern regions reaches a maximum of 
twenty basis points after 12 months, while the reaction of the southern Italian regions is 
smaller and more rapid: six basis points after 6 months. 
5.4. Alternative Identification Schemes 
We examine the robustness of the main results by adopting alternative identification 
schemes. Our basic identification scheme uses a recursive model in which the ordering of the   25
variables is [ it u , , it p , , it AC , it ALMP ], where the contemporaneously exogenous variables 
are ordered first. We consider four alternative identifying assumptions. In the first one (ID1), 
the (exogenous) unemployment shocks are extracted by conditioning on the current and 
lagged participation rate and all other lagged variables. This means that the variables are 
ordered as [ , it p , it u , , it AC , it ALMP ]. The second one (ID2) is obtained by changing the 
ordering of the basic model to [ it u , , it p , it ALMP , , it AC ].This means that the information 
on the current ALMP is used to identify the AC shocks. A third alternative (ID3) considers 
the ordering of [ it ALMP , it u , , it p , , it AC ] to allow the possibility that the ALMP shocks 
may affect the unemployment rate contemporaneously. Finally, the fourth identification 
schemes (ID4) considers the ordering of [ it u it ALMP , , it p , , it AC ]. In the case the 
information on the current ALMP is used to identify the participation rate shocks. 
 
Table 9: The Response of Unemployment under Alternative Identification Schemes 
South - Model 1 South - Model 2
H o r i z o n B A S I C I D  1I D  2I D  3I D  4 H o r i z o n B A S I C I D  1I D  2I D  3I D  4
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 -0.08 -0.06 -0.17 -0.19 -0.32 4 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
8 -0.30 -0.32 -0.20 -0.23 -0.30 8 -0.30 -0.41 -0.26 -0.32 -0.29
12 -0.32 -0.34 -0.14 -0.07 -0.26 12 -0.32 -0.41 -0.38 -0.37 -0.34
16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.06 0.02 -0.13 16 -0.15 -0.24 -0.22 -0.19 -0.24
20 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 20 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06
North - Model 1 North - Model 2
H o r i z o n B A S I C I D  1I D  2I D  3I D  4 H o r i z o n B A S I C I D  1I D  2I D  3I D  4
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 4 -0.08 -0.15 -0.17 -0.08 -0.15
8 -0.30 -0.28 -0.29 -0.27 -0.29 8 -0.30 -0.28 -0.27 -0.29 -0.29
12 -0.32 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 -0.33 12 -0.32 -0.37 -0.32 -0.39 -0.32
16 -0.15 -0.12 -0.17 -0.15 -0.19 16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19
20 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 20 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02  
 
Table 9 outlines the responses of the unemployment rate to a 1% shock to ALMP at 
different horizons. In all cases, the unemployment rate decreases in the short run and the 
effects are significant. Despite some differences, the evidence emerging from the table 
suggests that the timing of the unemployment response is similar across the identification   26
schemes; the ALMP shock exerts the maximum effect after roughly one years in almost all 
cases. This evidence stresses the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section. 
5.5 Results of forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) 
An important tool developed in the S-VAR framework is the forecast error variance 
decomposition. The main strength of this type of analysis is its ability to capture the weight 
of different variable innovations on a given variable forecast error variance decomposition.  
In other words, it yields information on the percentage of variation in the forecast error 
of a variable explained by its own innovation and the proportion explained by innovations in 
other variables at different horizons.  
Table 10 depicts the forecast error variance decomposition of the unemployment rate in 
the four models estimated above, and up to a two-year horizon, due to the four structural 
shocks. 
 
Table 10: Fraction of the Unemployment Rate that FEVD attributed to the four structural 
shocks 
Horizon Unemp. Partic. Part-time Almp Unemp. Partic. Fixed-term Almp
1 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
6 95.4 0.8 0.3 3.2 91.0 0.5 2.3 6.5
12 83.1 2.3 0.8 13.4 79.2 1.6 9.9 9.7
18 80.6 3.4 1.3 14.7 76.7 2.3 10.9 10.2
24 79.6 3.6 1.7 15.1 75.7 2.5 11.3 10.6
Horizon Unemp. Partic. Part-time Almp Unemp. Partic. Fixed-term Almp
1 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
6 83.1 6.3 3.8 6.7 83.5 6.4 5.4 4.7
12 65.4 8.8 17.3 8.5 71.1 9.6 10.1 9.3
18 56.9 8.4 25.4 9.3 68.8 9.1 10.7 11.4








The above table furnishes useful information on the relative capacities of ALMP and AC 
to affect unemployment dynamics at different horizons. 
Hence, according to the variance decomposition at short horizons, ALMP innovations do 
not play a major role in the monthly fluctuations of the unemployment rate. The dynamics of 
unemployment are largely dominated by its own shocks, and they indicate that short-run 
fluctuations in the unemployment rate display no association with active labour market 
programmes or with the dynamics of atypical contracts. For long horizons, we find that both   27
ALMP and atypical contracts exert a certain influence in determining unemployment 
dynamics. This influence varies across the regions.  
In the southern regions, unemployment is essentially driven by its own shocks. The fixed-
term ratio, although greater than the part-time variable, does not significantly affect 
movements in the unemployment rate: after two years, it explains 11% of the unemployment 
change. Nor do the ALMP shocks seem to explain more than 15% of unemployment 
change.  
In the northern regions, by contrast, unemployment dynamics seem to be partially 
explained by the increase in atypical contracts: in particular, movements in the part-time ratio 
after two years account for almost 30% of unemployment variation. 
We may conclude that there are different explanations for unemployment dynamics in the 
two areas. In the South neither ALMP nor AC seems to account for changes in the 
unemployment rate: the unemployment is driven by its own shocks. By contrast, in the 
northern regions, the unemployment dynamics is significantly explained by part-time work 
dynamics. 
6 Conclusions 
The paper has been concerned with theoretical and empirical measurement of the ability 
of ALMPs to reduce regional unemployment. The importance of the issues addressed 
springs from the possible asymmetries the differences in the economic structure of the 
Italian regions may arise concerning the effectiveness of alternative labour market programs. 
The econometric methodologies implemented have been the generalized method of 
moment (GMM) and the panel vector autoregression (P-VAR). As regards the former, we 
estimated a single equation dynamic panel data model for several dependent variables 
including employment rate, unemployment rate, and youth unemployment rate. The 
evidence furnished by this model suggested that the effects of different ALMPs on 
unemployment are dissimilar across the Italian regions. Some programmes are likely to have 
a greater effect in the South than in the North. The second methodology was based on the 
P-VAR framework, and it was used to estimate four different models, the purpose being to 
outline the effects that the total ALMP/labour force ratio and atypical contracts exert on 
unemployment dynamics.  
The impulse-response analysis highlighted the presence of significant differences across 
the Italian regions. Importantly, the results suggest that the unemployment rate in the 
regions selected responds to identical labour policy shocks with different speeds and   28
movements, and also with different magnitudes of effects. The same applies to the response 
of the unemployment rate to AC shocks. We also check the robustness of the results by 
imposing alternative identifying restrictions. The results suggest a similar quantitative 
response across alternative identification schemes. 
Finally, the forecast error variance decomposition yielded information on the extent to 
which various structural shocks affect the behaviour of each variable at different horizons. 
We conclude from this analysis that there are different explanations for unemployment 
dynamics in the two areas. In the South neither ALMP nor AC seems to be responsible for 
changes in the unemployment rate: unemployment is driven by its own shocks. In the North, 
by contrast, unemployment dynamics are significantly explained by part-time work dynamics. 
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